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Privacy amplification (PA) is an essential post-processing step in quantum key distribution (QKD)
for removing any information an eavesdropper may have on the final secret key. In this paper, we
consider delaying PA of the final key after its use in one-time pad encryption and prove its security.
We prove that the security and the key generation rate are not affected by delaying PA. Delaying
PA has two applications: it serves as a tool for significantly simplifying the security proof of QKD
with a two-way quantum channel, and also it is useful in QKD networks with trusted relays. To
illustrate the power of the delayed PA idea, we use it to prove the security of a qubit-based two-way
deterministic QKD protocol which uses four states and four encoding operations.
PACS numbers: 03.67.Dd, 03.67.-a, 03.67.Hk, 03.67.Ac
I. INTRODUCTION
Quantum key distribution (QKD) [1, 2] allows two par-
ties, Alice and Bob, to share a secret key by exchanging
quantum particles. The final secret key is secure against
any eavesdropper, called Eve, with unlimited computa-
tional power. Initial security proofs of QKD mostly focus
on infinite key size and perfect equipment [3–10]. More
recent security proofs take into consideration device im-
perfection [11–16]; while the effect of finite key size is
explicitly considered in Refs. [17–23].
QKD protocols usually involve two post-processing
steps after the quantum state transmission step: error
correction (EC) [24] to make sure Alice’s key is the same
as Bob’s and privacy amplification (PA) [25, 26] to en-
sure Eve does not have any non-trivial information on
the final secret key. The final secret key generated can
then be used in a subsequent cryptographic application
such as the one-time pad (OTP) [27, 28].
In this paper, we consider running QKD without im-
mediately running EC and PA. Assuming that OTP will
be used as the next step, we delay the application of
EC and PA until after the OTP, in effect performing a
weakly secure OTP. Delaying EC is trivial and requires
no extra attention since errors in the original key sim-
ply translate into the same errors in the OTP-encrypted
message, and bit errors do not affect the security of the
message. On the other hand, delaying PA is non-trivial
since normal PA ensures a key becomes secure first before
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being used, and now we use the insecure key first before
making it secure. These two operations do not appear to
be commuting, but we will prove that they do when we
choose an appropriate PA scheme. By commuting, we
mean that delayed PA is secure with the same security
level achieved by the same PA function used to make the
original raw key secure. In summary, we prove that de-
laying PA after OTP does not affect the security and the
key generation rate. Delayed PA will be the focus of the
paper.
At first glance, delaying privacy amplification does not
appear to be of much use. However, after a more thor-
ough thought, we find that it is useful on at least two
occasions. First, it is useful in the secret key sharing
between nodes in a QKD network where the nodes do
not have a direct quantum link with each other but are
separately connected to a common trusted relay. QKD
is run between each node and the intermediate trusted
relay, without running the full QKD post-processing.
Some post-processing such as EC and PA may be de-
layed1 until two nodes decide to share a key together, in
which case, these post-processing steps are run only be-
tween them. This is particularly useful when the classical
communication, computation, and/or energy costs asso-
ciated with the trusted relay are high, for example, as
in satellite-based QKD [29]. Thus, delaying some costly
post-processing parts can be beneficial. In this paper,
we do not discuss the trusted relay scenario but only the
validity of delaying PA in a general manner. Delaying
EC is more trivial since any two parties each holding a
1 Investigation of the possibility of delaying basis reconciliation is
beyond the scope of this paper.
2bit string can remove errors between their strings by ex-
changing error syndromes with each other.
The second situation where delayed PA is useful is that
we can use it to construct a two-way deterministic QKD
protocol (DQKD) [30–38], whose security against general
attacks is fully proved in this paper. A two-way deter-
ministic QKD protocol is a prepare-and-measure protocol
in which each signal (in our case, a qubit) makes a round
trip from Bob to Alice and back to Bob. In contrast to
conventional qubit-based QKD such as the BB84 proto-
col [1], the correct measurement basis is always used in
DQKD because the signals are both prepared and mea-
sured by Bob. To encode a key bit, Alice simply applies
some operation (based on her key bit value) on the qubit
sent by Bob and then returns it back to Bob. Bob can de-
code Alice’s key bit by a measurement in the same basis
as what he used to prepare the initial qubit. We remark
that two-way deterministic QKD with continuous vari-
ables has been shown to have the potential for enhancing
the security threshold [39]. Delayed PA may serve as
a tool for proving the security of two-way continuous-
variable QKD. In this paper, we focus on qubit-based
two-way DQKD.
The security of qubit-based two-way DQKD had been
a long-standing problem until our recent security proof
of it [40]. There, we directly compute the overall density
matrix of Alice, Bob, and Eve for one particular two-way
DQKD protocol in which Alice uses two operators for the
encoding of her bit. In this paper, we consider a different
qubit-based two-way DQKD protocol in which Alice uses
four encoding operators, and prove its security using the
delayed PA idea. We show that this particular protocol
resembles the integration of the BB84 protocol and OTP.
Because of this, our analysis is significantly simplified
since the security of the DQKD protocol against general
attacks will then directly derive from that of the BB84
protocol [6–10, 12] and OTP [28]. We simply rely on the
security results of the latter. Our proof idea is to convert
the integrated scheme to the DQKD protocol through a
series of equivalent protocols. We remark that the idea of
integrating QKD with OTP has been proposed before by
Deng and Long [35] without a rigorous security analysis.
The scheme of Deng and Long runs in a batch-after-batch
manner where a batch of qubits received by Alice on the
BB84 channel is stored in quantum memory first before
they are used as a batch for OTP encryption, in contrast
to our scheme in which each qubit is returned to Bob
immediately after reception by Alice.
The organization of the paper is as follows: After re-
viewing some preliminaries in Sec. II, we first prove the
security of delayed privacy amplification in Sec. III. This
will be an important tool that we will use in the con-
version to the DQKD protocol. The DQKD protocol is
described in Sec. IV and the detailed discussion of its
security proof based on the conversion argument is ex-
plained in Sec. V. To begin the conversion, we outline
the initial protocols of the conversion process in Sec. VA.
Then we discuss the conversion process in Sec. VB. We
conclude in Sec. VI.
II. PRELIMINARIES
A. Notations
Bit strings are represented as vectors with elements in
GF(2), where GF(q) is the Galois field with q elements.
We use ~k to denote such a vector and k[i] to denote the
ith bit. We define the projector function P (|φ〉) ≡ |φ〉〈φ|.
We denote the Pauli matrices by
I =
[
1 0
0 1
]
, X =
[
0 1
1 0
]
, Z =
[
1 0
0 −1
]
, Y = iXZ.
and the corresponding eigenstates by {|0w〉, |1w〉} where
w = x, y, z.
B. Security measure
We adopt the universal composability definition of se-
curity first proposed by Canetti [41]. This definition
quantifies the security of a cryptographic primitive in
terms of its deviation from the ideal functionality. The
notion of universal composability has been extended to
the QKD setting [42, 43].
Definition 1 ([10, 44, 45]). A classical random variable
K (representing the key) drawn from the set K is said
to be ǫ-secure with respect to an eavesdropper holding a
quantum system E if
1
2
Tr |ρKE − ρU ⊗ ρE | ≤ ǫ (1)
where ρKE =
∑
k∈K PK(k)|k〉〈k|⊗ρE|K=k is the state of
the systems K and E, PK(k) is the probability of having
K = k, ρU =
∑
k∈K |k〉〈k|/|K| represents an ideal key
taking values uniformly over K, and |K| is the size of K.
Here, Tr |A| =
∑
i |λi| where λi’s are the eigenvalues of
A.
QKD expands a shorter secret key to a longer one.
When one round of QKD that is ǫ1-secure expands on
a key generated by a previous round of QKD that is ǫ2-
secure, the composition of the two rounds is (ǫ1 + ǫ2)-
secure [43].
C. Additive functions
In this paper, we consider PA functions that are addi-
tive. A function f : GF(q)N → GF(q)NPA is said to be
additive if f(~a + ~b) = f(~a) + f(~b) for all ~a,~b ∈ GF(q)N
and the addition operators are defined in the respective
fields. For prime q, the function f is additive if and only
if it can be expressed in the form of matrix multiplication
f(~a) = A~a where addition and multiplication are defined
3in GF(q). The “if” part of this statement is obvious. To
prove the “only if” part, note that additivity implies lin-
earity when q is prime since every ~a ∈ GF(q)N can be
expressed as a pure summation of unweighted basis vec-
tors of some basis (e.g., a weighting of 2 is broken down
into a sum of two terms as in ~a = 2~v = ~v+~v, with ~v being
a basis vector) and f(~a) =
∑N
i=1 f(a[i]~vi) =
∑
i a[i]f(~vi),
where ~vi’s are the basis vectors. Thus, the columns of A
are f(~vi)’s.
We work in GF(2) throughout the paper and so q = 2
and we can always consider PA functions of the form
f(~a) = A~a. For q = pr being a power of a prime, we
can also restrict additive f to be of the same form in the
following sense. We may view GF(q) as a vector space
over its subfield GF(p), since any element of GF(q) can
be written in the form
∑r
i=1 γiβi, where γi ∈ GF(p),
βi ∈ GF(q), and βi cannot be expressed in the form γβj
for j 6= i and some γ ∈ GF(p). This means that an
element of GF(q) can be represented as a length-r vector
with elements γi. Thus, when we express the PA function
in the prime field so that f : GF(p)rN → GF(p)rNPA , the
statement that f is additive if and only if f(~a) = A~a
for all ~a ∈ GF(p)rN also holds. Of course, this does not
mean that f can be expressed as A~a for all ~a ∈ GF(pr)N .
Note that the number of additive PA functions grows
exponentially as N increases. This makes Eve’s job to at-
tack a key distribution scheme more difficult with larger
N as she has to make guesses on the PA function to
be used by Alice and Bob in order to customize her at-
tack. Also, additivity is not a very strong constraint and
additive functions are commonly used. For example, in
Toeplitz matrix based PA [22, 23, 46, 47], the PA function
f(~a) = A~a is additive where A is a Toeplitz matrix.
A property of an additive function f is that any image
of f is a translation of the kernel by some offset. This
means that the number of elements in every image is the
same. We will this property in the proof of Theorem 1.
III. DELAYED PRIVACY AMPLIFICATION
Suppose Alice has an N -bit raw key ~a on which Eve
has some information. The raw key, which may not be
completely secure, can be turned into a shorter secure
final key by applying PA. Bob initially holds an N -bit
raw key~b which is a noisy version of ~a and for the current
discussion of delayed PA, we assume that Bob can correct
all errors so that he also holds ~a. We denote the function
chosen by Alice and Bob for PA as f (mapping N bits
to NPA < N bits) and the secure key shared between
Alice and Bob as f(~a). Normally, to encrypt an NPA-
bit message ~m′, Alice computes f(~a) ⊕ ~m′ and sends it
to Bob. Bob can recover the original message ~m′ by
XORing2 the encrypted message with the shared key f(~a)
2 Exclusive OR (XOR), denoted by ⊕, is an operation on two bits,
such that i⊕ j = 0 if both i = j and i⊕ j = 1 otherwise. XOR
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(b)BB84 with PA delayed after the OTP. ~m can be regarded as
the expanded version of the secret message ~m′.
FIG. 1. Overview of delayed privacy amplification. The mes-
sage ~m′ is secure in both situations, even though Eve sees
different strings in the OTP channel. We show in Theorem 1
that security is not affected by whether Eve sees f(~a)⊕ ~m′ or
~a ⊕ ~m. Here, f is the PA function which shortens its input
and the arrow of the BB84 channel indicates the direction of
the qubits.
(see Fig. 1(a)). Eve, in the middle of Alice and Bob,
can see the encrypted message f(~a)⊕ ~m′, but cannot get
information on the original message ~m′ because she does
not know f(~a).
In a delayed PA scheme, Alice expands the original
message ~m′ to ~m for encryption with the pre-PA key
~a. We call the expanded message ~m the PA-inverse of
~m′. To do this securely, as we show below, Alice should
choose ~m (an N -bit string) uniformly among all strings
that satisfy ~m′ = f(~m). Alice then sends ~a⊕ ~m to Bob
(see Fig. 1(b)). We demand that f be additive. Thus,
anyone who receives this string can apply f to get f(~a⊕
~m) = f(~a) ⊕ ~m′, which is the encrypted message sent
in the normal OTP situation. In particular, Bob can
recover the original message by applying f and XORing
can be extended to become an operation on two bit strings by
XORing each bit pair independently.
4with the shared key f(~a). Alternatively, Bob can recover
the original message by XORing the received data with
the pre-PA key ~a and applying f . The security of the
original message ~m′ is not obvious, as Eve sees ~a⊕ ~m in
this delayed PA scheme, not f(~a⊕ ~m) in the normal OTP
scheme. Nevertheless, we show in the following theorem
that the security of the delayed PA scheme is identical to
that of the normal OTP scheme.
Theorem 1 (Security of delayed privacy amplification).
Given an additive function f that maps anN -bit string to
an NPA-bit string and that the final key f(~a) for some ~a
is ǫ-secure against Eve according to security Definition 1,
then, for some NPA-bit message ~m
′ chosen independently
of ~a, ~m′ is ǫ-secure against Eve (i.e., with the same se-
curity level) when she sees ~a⊕ ~m, where ~m is uniformly
chosen among all strings that satisfy ~m′ = f(~m).
Proof. Due to the security of OTP, ~m′ is secure when
Eve sees f(~a) ⊕ ~m′. Starting with this condition, we
convert it to the final condition claimed in the theorem.
Let f−1[~α] be the inverse image of ~α under f . Thus,
Eve seeing f(~a)⊕ ~m′ is effectively the same as Eve seeing
f−1[f(~a)⊕ ~m′] since Eve knows f and thus can compute
the former given the latter and vice versa. First note
that f−1[~α] has 2N−NPA elements irrespective of ~α. This
is because f is additive and has the form f(~a) = A~a
where A is an NPA ×N matrix. So, every inverse image
is in fact an affine subspace that can be translated to the
kernel of f by an offset. Hence, all inverse images f−1[~α]
for all ~α have the same number of elements3. This is
important since this allows us to use a random variable v
independent of ~α to select an element in the set f−1[~α].
The variable v has a fixed range and is drawn uniformly.
As the final part of the argument, note that giving
Eve a random element of f−1[f(~a)⊕ ~m′] chosen accord-
ing to v is equivalent to Eve seeing all the elements of
f−1[f(~a) ⊕ ~m′] and v. Since v is independent of the el-
ements of f−1[f(~a) ⊕ ~m′], knowing v gives Eve no ex-
tra information about f(~a) or ~m′ over what knowing
f−1[f(~a) ⊕ ~m′] gives. Thus, from Eve’s point of view,
seeing a random element of the set f−1[f(~a) ⊕ ~m′] is
equivalent to seeing the whole set. Choosing ~s uniformly
in f−1[f(~a)⊕ ~m′] means choosing ~s uniformly such that
f(~s) = f(~a)⊕ ~m′ or f(~s⊕~a) = ~m′. By defining ~m = ~s⊕~a,
we arrive at the claim of the theorem.
Remark 1. We note that delaying privacy amplification
does not affect the security and the key generation length.
The reason is as follows. Theorem 1 proves that the same
security level is achieved by delaying PA with the same
PA function. Since the PA function defines the final key
length, the key generation length is not affected.
3 Sec. III B describes the computation of f−1[~α] and shows explic-
itly how to find the 2N−NPA elements for a given ~α.
A. Special messages
We note the following special cases:
• (Random message) If the original message ~m′ is
also uniformly chosen (acting as a key), ~m can be
uniformly chosen without regard to the condition
~m′ = f(~m).
• (Imperfect key as message) If the original message
~m′ is an imperfect key, we can delay the PA of it
together with ~a. For instance, suppose that ~m′ =
g(~a′) is secure after applying the PA function g to
the insecure key ~a′. Then, the encrypting party can
send ~a⊕ ~m, where ~m is uniformly chosen among all
strings that satisfy g(~a′) = f(~m).
B. Computation of the PA-inverse
To apply the delayed PA scheme, given the original
message ~m′, Alice needs to compute its inverse by choos-
ing ~m uniformly among all strings that satisfy ~m′ =
f(~m). Here, we offer a method that Alice can use to
compute the PA-inverse ~m. Note that this is one possi-
ble method, there may be other methods with different
efficiencies to perform the same task.
Our method goes as follows. Since f is imposed to be
additive, it can be represented by a matrix multiplication
in GF(2), the finite field of two elements:
~m′ = f(~m) = A~m (2)
where A is an NPA × N matrix with entries in GF(2).
Multiplication of two elements is AND4, while addition
is XOR.
We assume that the rows of A are linearly indepen-
dent. Thus, we can apply row operations (XOR of two
rows) based on Gaussian elimination to express A in up-
per triangular form:
A = R


∗ ∗ · · · · · · · · · · · · ∗
0 ∗ · · · · · · · · · · · · ∗
. . .
0 · · · 0 ∗ · · · · · · ∗
0 · · · 0 0 ∗ · · · ∗

 (3)
where the last row has NPA − 1 zeros at the beginning
and R is an NPA × NPA matrix representing the row
operations with RR = I. Thus, given R~m′, we can find
~m by randomly choosing the last N − NPA elements of
~m and successively determining the remaining elements
of ~m by using the triangular structure.
4 AND is an operation on two bits such that i AND j = 1 only
when i = j = 1.
5C. Example usage: a simple relay
Suppose Bob and Charlie want to establish a secret
key, but they do not have a direct quantum link with
each other. Instead, Bob has a quantum link with Alice
(a relay) who has already shared a huge supply (denoted
as pool P) of perfectly secure5 key bits with Charlie.
Normally, Alice and Bob would run BB84 to generate
from an N -bit raw key ~a an NPA < N -bit final key f(~a).
With this key, Alice can OTP-encrypt NPA bits from
pool P and send the cipher text f(~a)⊕ ~m′ to Bob, where
~m′ denotes the bits from the pool. Bob then recovers
the confidential message ~m′ that Charlie knows and this
completes the task of sharing a key between Bob and
Charlie through Alice. If the key f(~a) is ǫ-secure against
Eve according to the universally composable definition in
Definition 1, the originally perfectly secure key ~m′ now
becomes ǫ-secure.
Suppose that the costs of classical communication,
computation, and/or energy of Alice are high. PA can
be costly in these aspects. In particular, performing PA
requires one party to transmit the full specification of
the PA function f(·) to the other party. For example,
Toeplitz matrix based PA needs N + NPA − 1 bits to
specify [22, 23, 46, 47], which can be a big number when
the block size is large. Also, performing Toeplitz ma-
trix based PA requires large matrix multiplication, which
translates to large computation and energy needs. These
can be costly for a satellite relay, for example. In order
to reduce these costs, Alice and Bob can delay PA and
turn it over to Bob and Charlie. To illustrate the idea of
delayed PA, we assume for simplicity that bit and phase
error testing and error correction are performed between
Alice and Bob as normal. Based on the phase error rate,
Bob as in the normal situation decides a particular PA
function f . But instead of telling Alice about f , Bob tells
Charlie about it. Now, with delayed PA, Alice can take
N bits from pool P and directly OTP-encrypt them with
the raw key ~a. ThisN -bit cipher text ~a⊕~m is transmitted
to Bob, where ~m denotes the N bits from the pool. Bob
recovers ~m, which Charlie knows. Both Bob and Char-
lie apply PA f to share a final secret key f(~m), which
has length NPA and is ǫ-secure according to Theorem 1.
This generates the same key as in the normal situation
without delayed PA. Note that in this example, we sac-
rifice more key bits between Alice and Charlie to save
the communication, computation, and/or energy costs of
Alice.
5 We assume for simplicity that the perfectly secure key is estab-
lished by face-to-face key exchange.
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FIG. 2. Protocol DQKD. Bob chooses one of the four qubit
states to send to Alice on the forward channel. She applies
one of the four operations to encode her key bit and returns
the qubit to Bob on the backward channel. Bob measures the
received qubit in the basis he originally used for the forward
qubit. The value of Alice’s key bit depends on Bob’s basis
(see Table I).
IV. TWO-WAY DETERMINISTIC QKD
PROTOCOL
Fig. 2 illustrates the two-way deterministic QKD pro-
tocol we consider in this paper, which we call Protocol
DQKD. The steps of Protocol DQKD are as follows. Note
that here and in the rest of paper, we present protocols in
the context of Koashi’s security analysis [12] in which pre-
shared secret keys are used for encrypted communications
of error correction information. However, paradigms of
other security analyses [6–9] are applicable as well.
1. (Qubit transmission) Bob sends qubits to Alice
taken in {|0z〉, |1z〉, |0x〉, |1x〉} on line B-to-A.
2. (Encoding) For each qubit received by Alice, she ei-
ther measures it with a random basis (check mode)
or applies a random operation to it before return-
ing it to Bob via line A-to-B (encoding mode). We
call the qubit in the check mode a test bit and in
the encoding mode a code bit. The operation she
applies in the encoding mode is I, X , Y , or Z cho-
sen with uniform probabilities. It does not matter
whether she returns a qubit to Bob via line A-to-B
in the check mode.
3. (Measurement by Bob) Bob measures each qubit
received on line A-to-B in the same basis as the
one he used for the state he sent to Alice on line
B-to-A in Step 1.
4. (Channel estimation) After transmission of all
qubits, Alice and Bob estimate the bit error rate
eb and phase error rate ep of line B-to-A using the
test bits measured in check mode in Step 2. They
can do this by comparing their bit values of those
qubits that Alice measured with consistent bases.
5. (Key reconciliation) Bob announces to Alice the
basis used for each code bit. Alice constructs her
key bit value based on the basis (see Table I): when
6Bit value
Basis 0 1
x {I,X} {Z, Y }
z {I, Z} {X,Y }
TABLE I. Key bit value dependence on the basis used by Bob
(x or z) and Alice’s encoding operation (I , X, Y , or Z). For
example, when Bob uses basis z, bit 1 is encoded by Alice if
she applies X or Y on the qubit sent by Bob.
the basis is x, the key bit is 0 (1) if she applied I
or X (Z or Y ); when the basis is z, the key bit is
0 (1) if she applied I or Z (X or Y ). Bob uses the
same rule to decide the key bit value. Note that
Alice and Bob do not discard any code bit. There
is no basis reconciliation step.
6. (Key bit error testing) Alice and Bob test for the
error rate e⇄b in the key bits by comparing a subset
of them. The remaining key bits form their raw
keys, ~a for Alice and ~b for Bob. We denote the
length of them by N .
7. (Final key generation) Alice and Bob choose a pri-
vacy amplification function f(·) that is additive and
maps N bits to NPA = N [1− h(ep)] bits. Alice ap-
plies privacy amplification to her raw key ~a to ob-
tain the final key ~k = f(~a). She sends Bob Nh(e⇄b )
bits of error correction information encrypted with
pre-shared secret bits. This allows Bob to correct
his raw key ~b to match Alice’s ~a. Bob then applies
PA to get the same final key ~k.
The net key expansion length is
Nkey,two-way = N [1− h(e
⇄
b )− h(ep)]. (4)
In Sec. VB, we will show that the newly generated key
with length NPA is secure, thus the net key gain given
in Eq. (4) is achievable. We will prove this by combin-
ing the BB84 protocol and the OTP protocol, and then
successively converting the OTP protocol to finally form
the two-way DQKD protocol given here.
An interesting feature of two-way DQKD is that every
code bit encoded by Alice in the encoding mode will be
used for the final key generation without being wasted
due to measurement basis mismatch. There is no basis
reconciliation for the key bits and this is why the protocol
is called deterministic6. This is in contrast to the original
6 Note that the term deterministic was first introduced in Ref. [30]
to mean that when Alice wants to send 0 (or 1) to Bob, she can
encode her bit definitely. This makes sense in quantum direct
communication, but not QKD. We borrow this term to the QKD
setting but only use it to mean that every code bit will be used
to generate the final key, instead of that every code bit is the
final key bit. This is because Alice and Bob need to run privacy
BB84 protocol where half of the code bits are discarded.
On the other hand, the efficient BB84 protocol [48] allows
all code bits to be used as well, but only asymptotically.
Therefore, in finite-length situations, two-way DQKD is
still more efficient in using the code bits.
Note that the test bits in the check mode of two-way
DQKD are measured by Alice with a random basis and
thus are subject to discarding due to basis mismatch.
Thus, the check mode performances are the same in two-
way DQKD and BB84.
A disadvantage of two-way DQKD is that the quantum
signals emitted by Bob suffer from twice the channel loss
compared to BB84.
V. SECURITY PROOF OF TWO-WAY DQKD
The security proof of the two-way DQKD protocol is
based on arguing for the equivalence of the protocol with
an integrated scheme, and thus the security of the former
directly follows from that of the latter. The integrated
scheme consists of the BB84 protocol on the forward line
and one-time pad on the backward line. The security of
both are well established [6–10, 12, 28]. Starting with
the integrated scheme in Sec. VA, we will convert it to
the two-way DQKD protocol in Sec. VB.
A. Original Protocols for constructing two-way
DQKD
Here, we outline the steps of the BB84 protocol and
OTP, which serve as the starting point of the conversion
process.
Protocol 1 on line B-to-A: BB84
We can view the line from Bob to Alice as a BB84
key distillation step. The steps of BB84 are shown be-
low, where we assume for simplicity the use of quantum
memory to avoid the step of discarding bits measured
with inconsistent bases.
Protocol 1 (BB84 with quantum memory) on line B-
to-A:
1. Bob sends N + Ntest qubits to Alice taken in
{|0z〉, |1z〉, |0x〉, |1x〉}.
2. Alice stores allN+Ntest received qubits in quantum
memory.
amplification which is determined only after Alice has encoded
all the raw key bits. Privacy amplification will then turn Alice’s
raw key bits to a new bit string that is different from what she
initially sent.
73. Bob announces the basis of each qubit, and Alice
measures her qubits in the corresponding bases.
4. Alice and Bob randomly select Ntest test bits to
find out the bit error rate eb and phase error rate
ep for this line B-to-A.
7 Alice and Bob choose a
privacy amplification function f(·) that is additive
and maps N bits to NPA = N(1− h(ep)) bits.
5. The final secret key is derived from Alice’s raw
key as an NPA-bit string ~k = f(~a). To allow
Bob to obtain the same final key, Alice sends Bob
NEC = Nh(eb) bits of error correction information
encrypted with pre-shared secret bits of the same
size so that Bob can correct his raw key~b to become
~a. He then applies the same privacy amplification
function f(·) to get the final key ~k.
Now, according to Koashi’s security proof of the BB84
protocol [12] (see also other proofs [6–9]), the final key
~k is secure against Eve with the the net key expansion
length as
Nkey = NPA −NEC = N [1− h(eb)− h(ep)]. (5)
Protocol 2 on line A-to-B: one-time pad
We can view the line from Alice to Bob as a one-time
pad encryption step.
6. Alice encrypts an NPA-bit message f(~m) with the
secret key ~k with one-time pad and sends the en-
crypted message f(~m) ⊕ ~k to Bob over a classical
channel. (As we will see later, ~m will be chosen
randomly with uniform probabilities.)
7. Bob decrypts his received data with key ~k to get
the secret message f(~m).
Here, Eve sees f(~m)⊕ ~k on line A-to-B and the message
f(~m) is secure against her because of the security of one-
time pad [28].
B. Conversion from original protocol
We successively convert the original Protocol 2 to new
Protocols 2b, 2c, and 2d, while maintaining the same se-
curity in each step to finally arrive at the two-way DQKD
7 The average quantum bit and phase error rates eb and ep are
related to the classical bit error rates in the x basis test bits and
the z basis test bits, denoted as ex and ez respectively. Asymp-
totically, the quantum bit error rate and the phase error rate
for the remaining x (z) basis bits are ex and ez respectively (ez
and ex respectively). Thus, the average quantum bit error rate
is eb = (ex + ez)/2 and the average quantum phase error rate
is eb = (ez + ex)/2. Even though they are the same, we use
separate symbols for them to emphasize their meanings in secret
key distillation.
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FIG. 3. (Color online) Protocols 2b, 2c, and 2d are equiv-
alent. The equivalence between Protocols 2c and 2d can be
understood intuitively by noting that both a measurement
and a depolarizing operation disentangle line B-to-A and line
A-to-B. This is rigorously shown by comparing their density
matrices in Eq. (6) of Protocol 2c and Eqs. (8)-(9) of Protocol
2d. We identify the message bit m1 (m2) of Protocol 2d with
m of Protocol 2c when w = z (w = x). Thus, Protocol 2d
requires Bob to inform his basis w to Alice so that she knows
whether m1 or m2 is used for the final key generation. In all
cases, privacy amplification f is delayed after OTP to gener-
ate the final secret key f(~m), and the top part of each figure is
Protocol 1. Here, we assume for simplicity that the backward
line A-to-B is noiseless, but noise can be incorporated easily
(see Sec. VC). QC: quantum channel; CC: classical channel.
8protocol. Figure 3 shows the equivalent protocols and
they are described in more detail in the following.
Protocol 2b on line A-to-B: one-time pad with
delayed privacy amplification
6. Alice encrypts an N -bit random message ~m with
her raw key ~a with one-time pad and sends the
encrypted message ~m ⊕ ~a to Bob over a classical
channel line A-to-B.
7. Bob recovers the secret message f(~m) as follows.
He applies privacy amplification to his received bits
to get f(~m ⊕ ~a). Due to the additivity of f(·), his
received data is f(~m)⊕ f(~a) = f(~m)⊕ ~k which he
can decrypt with the same key ~k to recover the mes-
sage f(~m). Alternatively, he can XOR his received
string ~m⊕~a with the raw key ~a and apply privacy
amplification f to recover the message f(~m).
Here, Eve sees ~m⊕ ~a and this is different from the situ-
ation in Protocol 2. Nevertheless, as we have shown in
Theorem 1, the security of f(~m) is the same as that in
Protocol 2, meaning that Eve cannot get any information
about f(~m).
Protocol 2c on line A-to-B: one-time pad on
quantum channel, with measurement
Line A-to-B is now regarded as a quantum channel,
even though we use it for the communication of the
classical OTP-encrypted message. We encode the OTP-
encrypted classical message in Step 6 of Protocol 2b ~m⊕~a
in a quantum state so that it can be carried by the quan-
tum channel. This is easily done by encoding each bit in
the eigenstate of some basis. Here, we assume that the
basis used is the same basis w = x, z Bob used to encode
his qubit on line B-to-A. Also, we assume for simplicity
that Alice knows w for each bit. Thus, the N -qubit state
Alice sends is |(~m⊕ ~a)~w〉 ≡
⊗
i
∣∣(m[i]⊕ a[i])w[i]〉 where
the index i denotes the ith bit for the message, key, and
basis. The modified steps are as follows:
6. Alice encrypts an N -bit random message ~m with
the raw key ~a with one-time pad and sends the en-
crypted message |(~m⊕ ~a)~w〉 to Bob over the quan-
tum channel line A-to-B.
7. Bob measures the N qubits received from line A-to-
B in basis ~w to recover the OTP-encrypted message
~m ⊕ ~a. He recovers the secret message f(~m) as in
Step 7 of Protocol 2b.
Overall density matrix
We first consider the state |Ψ[i]〉AA¯ for the ith bit
shared after Alice received her N qubits from line B-
to-A (where system A is the ith qubit received by Alice
on line B-to-A and system A¯ includes all the remain-
ing systems including Eve’s and Bob’s states for the N
transmissions and Alice’s remaining N − 1 qubits). To
simplify notation, we drop the index i from all symbols
(including |Ψ[i]〉, w[i], and a[i]) in the following since we
always deal with the ith qubit. This state |Ψ〉 is the
state before Alice decides to send anything on line A-to-
B. In Protocol 2c, Alice measures her state of A in basis
w = x, z using the projection {|0w〉〈0w|, |1w〉〈1w|}. So
the overall state becomes
∑
a=0,1 |aw〉A|Ψ(a, w)〉A¯|a〉A′
where |Ψ(a, w)〉A¯ ≡ 〈aw|A ⊗ IA¯|Ψ〉AA¯ and system A
′ is
the ancilla for storing the measurement result. We specif-
ically isolate the raw key bit a in system A′ so that we can
use it to perform OTP with the message bitm. Next, Al-
ice prepares a random message 2−1
∑
m=0,1 |m〉M 〈m| and
runs controlled-Z (if w = x) or controlled-X (if w = z)
on systems M (as control) and A. This is equivalent
to the OTP encryption resulting in the overall density
matrix
ρMAA¯A′ =
1
2
∑
m=0,1
|m〉M 〈m| ⊗
P
(∑
a=0,1
|(m⊕ a)w〉A|Ψ(a, w)〉A¯|a〉A′
)
,
in which system A is sent by Alice on line A-to-B to Bob
and system M is her message bit.
After the OTP encryption, the raw key bit a is no
longer needed. Thus, we trace over system A′ to get the
overall state
ρMAA¯ =
1
2
∑
a=0,1
m=0,1
P (|m〉M |(m⊕ a)w〉A|Ψ(a, w)〉A¯) .(6)
Note that tracing over system A′ which contains the raw
key bit does not mean giving the raw key bit to Eve.
Eve’s state is contained in system A¯. The state in Eq. (6)
is important for our discussion since it contains all the
relevant systems in the protocol. In fact, Protocol 2d in
the next section will be shown to be equivalent to Pro-
tocol 2c here by showing that the corresponding states
there are the same as Eq. (6).
Protocol 2d on line A-to-B: one-time pad on
quantum channel, without measurement
In the previous Protocol 2c, the measurement by Al-
ice disentangles line B-to-A and line A-to-B. Therefore,
to come up with an equivalent protocol without a mea-
surement, we need to reproduce this disentanglement
feature and at the same time achieve the same over-
all state in Eq. (6). One way to do this is by replac-
ing the measurement by a depolarizing channel. Start-
ing with the same initial state |Ψ〉AA¯ for the ith bit
as in the previous subsection, Alice performs randomly
9with uniform probabilities the operations, I, X , Y , or
Z on each of her N qubits independently. We ex-
press this random operation as Alice using a mixed state
4−1
∑
m1,m2=0,1
|m1m2〉M1M2〈m1m2| to control the four
operations on system A:
|Ψ〉AA¯〈Ψ| →
1
4
∑
m1,m2=0,1
|m1m2〉M1M2〈m1m2| ⊗
(Xm1Zm2)A|Ψ〉AA¯〈Ψ|(Z
m2Xm1)A (7)
Here, we assume Alice holds the purification of this mixed
state. Tracing the right hand side overM1 orM2, simple
calculations (see Appendix A) lead to
ρM1AA¯=
1
2
∑
a=0,1
m1=0,1
P
(
|m1〉M1 |(m1 ⊕ a)z〉A|Ψ(a, z)〉A¯
)
(8)
ρM2AA¯=
1
2
∑
a=0,1
m2=0,1
P
(
|m2〉M2 |(m2 ⊕ a)x〉A|Ψ(a, x)〉A¯
)
(9)
Note that Eqs. (8) and (9) are expressed in terms of bases
z and x respectively, regardless of the actual basis w used
by Bob to encode system A.
We argue that Protocol 2c and Protocol 2d are the
same as follows. Eqs. (8) and (9) represent the final over-
all state of Protocol 2d and we compare them to that of
Protocol 2c in Eq. (6). We can see that when w = z
(w = x), we can identify m1 in Eq. (8) (Eq. (9)) with m
in Eq. (6). Thus, when w = z (w = x), we can regard
that Alice’s message bit is in m1 (m2). Once the basis
w is publicly announced by Bob, all of Alice, Bob, and
Eve will know whether m1 or m2 will be used by Alice;
in other words, they will know which of Eqs. (8) and
(9) describes the situation. Therefore, Protocol 2c and
Protocol 2d are the same from Eve’s and Bob’s points of
view.
In Protocol 2d, we need a step for Bob to inform Alice
about w so that she knows whether m1 or m2 is her
message bit. Note that when Alice performs one of the
four operations of the depolarizing channel, she does not
know what the message bit value is (unless m1 = m2).
After Bob receives his qubit, he announces to Alice his
basis choice w and only then does Alice know the value
of her own message bit.
The modified steps of Protocol 2d are as follows:
6. Alice chooses two N -bit random messages ~m1 and
~m2. For each qubit received from line B-to-A, she
applies Z if m2 = 1 and applies X if m1 = 1.
8
The qubit is then forwarded back to Bob via line
A-to-B.
7. Bob measures the N qubits received from line A-
to-B in basis w which he has used in Step 1.
8 Note that the order of applications of these two operations does
not matter in light of Eq. (7) as swapping the order contributes
a factor of −1 twice.
8. Bob announces to Alice the basis for each qubit.
If the basis is z (x), Alice’s message bit is m1
(m2). So in the previous step, Bob’s measured
qubit corresponds to Alice’s OTP-encrypted mes-
sage bit m1 ⊕ a (for w = z) or m2 ⊕ a (for w = x).
He recovers the secret message f(~m) as in Step 7
of Protocol 2b, with the appropriate substitution
m1 → m or m2 → m for each bit. Alice also con-
structs the secret message f(~m) with the same sub-
stitution.
Therefore, when line A-to-B is noiseless, Alice and Bob
will share the message bit m1 (for w = z) or m2 (for
w = x). When line A-to-B is noisy, we can add further
error testing and error correction for ~m, which we have
omitted for simplicity of discussion. Finally, we note that
combining Protocol 1 and Protocol 2d essentially gives
Protocol DQKD given in Sec. IV.9 Thus, we have proved
the security of Protocol DQKD.
We remark that it makes sense that Alice’s message
bit depends on the basis used by Bob. Because when
Bob initially sends, for example, a z-eigenstate to Alice
via line B-to-A, only Alice’s X operation (controlled by
m1) will bit flip the state, and so m1 should become her
message bit.
C. Key generation rates
In Protocols 2, 2b, 2c, and 2d, we assume that the fi-
nal key is derived from applying privacy amplification to
Alice’s raw key: ~k = f(~a). Bob is responsible for cor-
recting his raw key to match Alice’s. To ensure security,
Alice’s message ~m is shortened to NPA = N(1 − h(ep))
bits of secure message f(~m), where ep is obtained from
Step 4 of Protocol 1. In the discussion so far, we have not
considered errors on line A-to-B. Errors on line B-to-A
cause Alice’s raw key to be different from Bob’s raw key
such that ~b = ~a ⊕ ~e1, where ~e1 is the error pattern with
an error rate of eb (cf. Step 4 of Protocol 1). Errors on
line A-to-B cause Bob to receive ~m⊕ ~a⊕ ~e2 in Step 6 of
Protocol 2b, where ~e2 is the error pattern on this line and
could be correlated with ~e1. Thus, when Bob uses ~b to
decrypt his message received on line A-to-B, he faces the
error pattern ~e1 ⊕ ~e2, whose error rate we denote as e
⇄
b .
To help Bob correct for this error pattern, Alice sends to
Bob error correction information encrypted with N(e⇄b )
bits of the pre-shared secret key. Therefore, the net key
expansion length is
Nkey,two-way = N [1− h(e
⇄
b )− h(ep)]. (10)
This represents the key generation rate for the integration
of Protocol 1 and any of Protocols 2, 2b, 2c, and 2d. As
9 The key bit error testing of Step 6 of Protocol DQKD is omitted
in Protocol 2d for simplicity of discussion, but this step can easily
be added without affecting the result.
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expected, this is the same formula for the two-way DQKD
protocol given in Eq. (4) . As a special case, when the
error rates on the two lines are both eb, the overall error
rate e⇄b is upper-bounded by 2eb since the errors on the
two lines can be correlated. Thus, the key generation
rate in this case is 1− h(2eb)− h(ep), which is the same
as that derived for another two-way DQKD protocol in
Ref. [40] (see Sec. III F therein).
Note that as Alice and Bob are correcting the overall
error pattern ~e1 ⊕ ~e2, they do not need to separately
correct for the error ~e1 in their raw keys; i.e., they do
not perform Step 5 of Protocol 1. This is reflected in the
original two-way DQKD protocol in Sec. IV.
VI. CONCLUSIONS
The central idea of our paper is delayed privacy ampli-
fication and we have proved its security. Delayed PA is
useful for secret key sharing between nodes of a QKD net-
work assisted by trusted relays, and for the security proof
of a qubit-based two-way DQKD protocol. We anticipate
that delayed PA will have further uses in other applica-
tions, such as the security proof of two-way continuous-
variable QKD [39].
In this paper, we derived the qubit-based two-way
DQKD protocol from an integration of the BB84 pro-
tocol and OTP, with the condition that PA is delayed
after the one-time pad. Because of our security proof of
delayed PA, the original security of BB84 directly carries
over to the DQKD protocol. Thus, we have proved the
security of the DQKD protocol against general attacks
with qubit signals. This illustrates the power of the de-
layed PA idea.
Security analysis of DQKD with multi-qubit signals
and decoy states [49–51] is beyond the scope of the cur-
rent paper and will be left for future work. Also, using
non-additive privacy amplification functions in delayed
privacy amplification will be considered in the future.
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Appendix A: Derivation of Eq. (8) from Eq. (7)
We only derive Eq. (8) from Eq. (7). The deriva-
tion of Eq. (9) is similar. First, we decompose |Ψ〉AA¯ =∑
i=0,1 λi|iz〉A|ei〉A¯ where |iz〉A are the normalized eigen-
states of basis z and |ei〉A¯ are normalized but not nec-
essarily orthogonal. We trace the state of Eq. (7) over
M2:
ρM1AA¯ =
1
4
∑
m1=0,1
|m1〉M1〈m1| ⊗ [P (X
m1
A |Ψ〉AA¯) + P ((X
m1Z)A|Ψ〉AA¯)]
=
1
4
|0〉M1〈0| ⊗
[
P
(
λ0|0z〉A|e0〉A¯ + λ1|1z〉A|e1〉A¯
)
+ P
(
λ0|0z〉A|e0〉A¯ − λ1|1z〉A|e1〉A¯
)]
+
1
4
|1〉M1〈1| ⊗
[
P
(
λ0|1z〉A|e0〉A¯ + λ1|0z〉A|e1〉A¯
)
+ P
(
λ0|1z〉A|e0〉A¯ − λ1|0z〉A|e1〉A¯
)]
=
|λ0|
2
2
[
|0〉M1〈0| ⊗ |0z〉A〈0z|+ |1〉M1〈1| ⊗ |1z〉A〈1z|
]
⊗ |e0〉A¯〈e0|+
|λ1|
2
2
[
|0〉M1〈0| ⊗ |1z〉A〈1z|+ |1〉M1〈1| ⊗ |0z〉A〈0z|
]
⊗ |e1〉A¯〈e1|.
The last equation is equal to Eq. (8) by noting that
|Ψ(k, z)〉A¯ ≡ 〈kz|A ⊗ IA¯|Ψ〉AA¯ = λk|ek〉A¯.
The derivation of Eq. (9) from Eq. (7) can be done in
a similar manner by decomposing |Ψ〉AA¯ in the x basis
as |Ψ〉AA¯ =
∑
i=0,1 λ
′
i|ix〉A|e
′
i〉A¯.
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